Rogers Commission Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

simplified cross section of joints between rocket segments srb; outside left.

legend:

a – steel wall 0.5 inches (12.7 mm) thick

b – base o-ring gasket,

c – backup o-ring gasket,

d – strengthening-cover band,

e – insulation,

f – insulation,

g – carpeting,

h – sealing paste,

i – fixed propellant

the presidential commission on space shuttle challenger accident, known rogers commission after chairman, formed investigate disaster. commission members chairman william p. rogers, vice chairman neil armstrong, david acheson, eugene covert, richard feynman, robert hotz, donald kutyna, sally ride, robert rummel, joseph sutter, arthur walker, albert wheelon, , chuck yeager. commission worked several months , published report of findings. found challenger accident caused failure in o-rings sealing joint on right solid rocket booster, allowed pressurized hot gases , flame blow o-ring , make contact adjacent external tank, causing structural failure. failure of o-rings attributed faulty design, performance compromised factors including low temperature on day of launch.

members of rogers commission arrive @ kennedy space center.

more broadly, report considered contributing causes of accident. salient failure of both nasa , morton thiokol respond adequately danger posed deficient joint design. rather redesigning joint, came define problem acceptable flight risk. report found managers @ marshall had known flawed design since 1977, never discussed problem outside reporting channels thiokol—a flagrant violation of nasa regulations. when became more apparent how serious flaw was, no 1 @ marshall considered grounding shuttles until fix implemented. on contrary, marshall managers went far issue , waive 6 launch constraints related o-rings. report criticized decision-making process led launch of challenger, saying flawed:

failures in communication ... resulted in decision launch 51-l based on incomplete , misleading information, conflict between engineering data , management judgments, , nasa management structure permitted internal flight safety problems bypass key shuttle managers.

richard feynman

one of commission s members theoretical physicist richard feynman. feynman, ill cancer, reluctant undertake job. did find root cause of disaster, , speak plainly public findings. @ start of investigation, fellow members dr. sally ride , general kutyna gave feynman hint o-rings not tested @ temperatures below 10 °c (50 °f). during televised hearing, feynman demonstrated how o-rings became less resilient , subject seal failures @ ice-cold temperatures immersing sample of material in glass of ice water. while other members of commission met nasa , supplier top management, feynman sought out engineers , technicians answers. critical of flaws in nasa s safety culture , so threatened remove name report unless included personal observations on reliability of shuttle, appeared appendix f. in appendix, argued estimates of reliability offered nasa management wildly unrealistic, differing as thousandfold estimates of working engineers. successful technology, concluded, reality must take precedence on public relations, nature cannot fooled.