Post-breakup flight controller dialogue Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

jay greene @ console after breakup of challenger




mission control during liftoff of challenger (sts-51-l)

in mission control, there burst of static on air-to-ground loop challenger disintegrated. television screens showed cloud of smoke , water vapor (the product of hydrogen+oxygen combustion) challenger had been, pieces of debris falling toward ocean. @ t+89, flight director jay greene prompted flight dynamics officer (fido) information. fido responded [radar] filter has discreting sources , further indication challenger had broken multiple pieces. moments later, ground controller reported negative contact (and) loss of downlink of radio , telemetry data challenger. greene ordered team watch data , sign orbiter had escaped.

at t+110.250, range safety officer (rso) @ cape canaveral air force station sent radio signals activated range safety system s destruct packages on board both solid rocket boosters. normal contingency procedure, undertaken because rso judged free-flying srbs possible threat land or sea. same destruct signal have destroyed external tank had not disintegrated. srbs close end of scheduled burn (t+110 seconds after launch) , had exhausted propellants when destruct command sent, little, if explosive force generated event.

public affairs officer steve nesbitt reported: flight controllers here looking @ situation. major malfunction. have no downlink.

on mission control loop, greene ordered contingency procedures put effect; these procedures included locking doors of control center, shutting down telephone communications outside world, , following checklists ensured relevant data correctly recorded , preserved.

nesbitt relayed information public: have report flight dynamics officer vehicle has exploded. flight director confirms that. looking @ checking recovery forces see can done @ point.